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The purpose of the article is to establish and theoretically justify 
a new “constitutional mindset” for a direct application of 
constitutional human rights in the private sector, based on moral 
arguments that are reinforced and illustrated by today’s democratic 
and social reality.  Generally, constitutional human rights are 
viewed as part of public law and are to be applied in private law 
through the indirect application model; however, this doctrine has 
proven to be limited, implicit, and unsystematic.  According to our 
view, moral ideals at the heart of a democratic regime hold the basis 
for individual direct reliance on constitutional human rights, 
regardless of whether the breaching entity is a government, 
corporation, or individual. 
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Moreover, the necessity of implementing the direct application 
model is increasingly evident in light of today’s reality, in which 
non-governmental bodies have acquired unprecedented economic 
and social power and influence.  In light of this change, comparative 
and international discourse has increased the responsibility of the 
private sector to uphold constitutional human rights principles 
accordingly.  The direct application model, as advocated in this 
article and that can be implied by the 2011 UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, suggests that states should 
expressively and actively address the governance gap of 
constitutional human rights in order to provide incentive for 
corporations to abide human rights obligations; this will provide 
tangible remedies for those injured by these violations and 
consequently uphold key democratic principles that define modern 
society. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
“Where, after all, do universal rights begin? In small 
places, close to home . . .  Yet they are the world of the 
individual person . . .  Unless these rights have meaning 
there, they have little meaning anywhere.” 
Eleanor Roosevelt (U.N., New York, March 27, 1958) 
 
This article discusses the direct application of constitutional 
human rights in the realm of private law.  Generally, constitutional 
rights are viewed as part of public law and are applied in private 
law through the indirect application model, which has proven to be 
limited, implicit, and unsystematic.  According to our view, the basis 
for individual direct reliance on constitutional human rights is 
democratic ideals, regardless of whether the identity of the 
breaching entity is a government, corporation, or individual.  For 
example, if three individuals, who were protesting in silence and 
bearing signs outside the President’s home were removed by 
civilians who effectively prevented the protesters from 
implementing their right to demonstrate.  Were the demonstrators’ 
constitutional rights (including freedom of expression and freedom 
to demonstrate) infringed on by their fellow civilians?  Or does the 
fact that they were civilians and not police officers or other 
government officials prevent them from making this claim? 
Alternatively, what about an individual privately 
communicating with a friend through e-mail regarding recent 
relationship issues with their spouse and the next day an unrelated 
site provides an advertisement for a divorce attorney.  Can this 
violation of privacy and human dignity throughout the Internet be 
ignored when committed by private corporations, which today can 
be larger and more powerful than some countries?  Are the 
principles purportedly underlying arrangements for the protection 
of privacy and human dignity throughout the Internet in a 
democratic state meant to distinguish between corporations and the 
Ministry of Interior? 
The approach that we present and defend negates the crucial 
role ascribed to the distinction between violations of citizens’ 
constitutional rights according to the identity of the infringing 
party—i.e., a police officer and a bystander or a government 
ministry and a private business enterprise.  We hold that clinging to 
this traditional distinction has the potential to harm democracy’s 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/3
2019] Human Rights in the Private Sphere 423 
basic principles or violate an individual’s rights.  We argue that the 
basis of democracy is a uniform set of principles compelling 
effective protection from any violation of the elemental liberties at 
the foundation of citizens’ constitutional rights, whether by 
authorities, another citizen, corporation, or entity.  We argue for the 
direct application approach; that the constitutional set of rights and 
balancing principles at the core of the democratic regime should be 
applied directly in both public and private contexts.  This claim 
gains significance in light of the increasing economic and social 
significance of corporations and an increasingly vocal international 
discourse supporting imposing human rights on business 
corporations.1 
Traditionally, the law has perceived constitutional human rights 
as a barrier protecting individuals from the state’s “omnipotent” 
power—to somewhat ease the power imbalance between 
individuals and the government.  In this sense, human rights were 
perceived as a part of public law.  Due to this traditional starting 
point, discourse on human rights in private law has been lacking, 
and unsystematic, even though private law has also discussed 
human rights in one way or another, but without using the specific 
language of rights.2  Accordingly, the basic question touching on 
what is the most effective way to implement human rights in 
individual relationships has remained unanswered and 
controversial.3 
Comparative law shows that the usual way of implementing 
human rights in private law relies on an “indirect” application 
model, in which human rights fall below constitutional laws and are 
“equal” to ordinary legislation or common law.  They apply in 
individual relationships, but indirectly, through legal techniques 
                                                             
 1 See generally Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, annex (Jun. 
16, 2011) [hereinafter UN Guiding Principles] (presenting the guiding principles of 
state duty and corporate responsibility to protect human rights and their access to 
a remedy). 
 2 See generally DANIEL FRIEDMANN & DAPHNE BARAK-EREZ, HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN PRIVATE LAW (2001), (the introduction to human rights in private law). 
 3 See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 354 (Julian Rivers 
tr., 2002), (discussing the construction of horizontal effect). 
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with roots in private law (such as the interpretation of private law—
including its safety-valve concepts—and the filling of lacuna 
through the case law) that serve as channels to incorporate specific 
components of constitutional rights.4 
The “direct” application of human rights in individual 
relationships, which is the familiar public law approach concerning 
government authorities, is not generally implemented—even 
though some constitutions (e.g., South Africa and Greece) formally 
enable it,5 and trends of judicial activism in Germany, Canada, and 
the United States have broadened it to include individual human 
rights. 
The main purpose of the current article is to theoretically justify 
and establish the discourse on the direct application of human rights 
in the private sector, while challenging notable criticism.  We hold, 
contrary to the prevalent view, that human rights must be applied 
directly and explicitly also in private law.  We aim to provide an 
alternative “constitutional mindset” to the prevailing legal approach 
of the indirect application model, based on moral arguments that are 
reinforced and illustrated by today’s democratic and social reality in 
which corporations have acquired unprecedented economic and 
social power and influence. 
Part One opens with a philosophical and theoretical discussion 
of the democratic regime’s fundamental principles and of the 
warranted conclusions concerning the general status of basic 
liberties and basic rights generally set in the constitution and 
considers the differences between the direct and indirect application 
models of human rights in private law.  Part Two discusses 
normative justifications as well as developments in the legal and 
public discourse on corporate law and human rights, while 
emphasizing the importance and effectiveness of adapting the direct 
application model in private law  specifically in today’s corporate 
                                                             
 4 See Mattias Kumm & Víctor Ferreres Comella, What Is So Special About 
Constitutional Rights in Private Litigation? A Comparative Analysis of the Function of 
State Action Requirements and Indirect Horizontal Effect, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 
PRIVATE RELATIONS: EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONALISM 265 (András Sajó & Renáta 
Uitz eds., 2005) (a comparative analysis of the function of state action requirements 
and indirect horizontal effect); for a review of the various approaches, see AHARON 
BARAK, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ELIKA BARAK-USSOSKIN 363, 368–378 (Steven Adler et. 
al. eds., 2012) [Heb]; see also Aharon Barak, Constitution Human Rights and Private 
Law, 3698 YALE L. SCHOOL FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, 218, 220 (1996), (presenting 
models for the application of constitutional human rights in private law). 
 5 See HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE SPHERE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 158–
159 (Dawn Oliver et.al. eds., 2007) (analyzing Greek legal theory on interpersonal 
effect of constitutional rights). 
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reality and international discourse.  Finally, the article explains how 
international initiatives, led by the UN 2011 Guiding Principles 
provide further support for the direct application model and the 
importance of its use in the modern corporate structure of society. 
2.  DIRECT APPLICATION MODEL 
2.1.  Democracy, Human Rights, and Law 
As we claim, and is discussed herein, the direct application 
model rests on the essence of the democratic regime and views the 
basic principles of democracy as moral principles.  We will therefore 
briefly describe the view of the democratic regime that underlies this 
article6 to provide a theoretical justification for the use of the direct 
application model in a modern democracy.7  We first present the 
central ideas of this view, which is within the philosophical tradition 
of the social contract, and then place it within the context of the 
philosophical theories dealing with just arrangements in a state’s 
civil society. 
A democratic regime is viewed as a solution to a specific 
problem, so that every important component of it is part of this 
solution.  The understanding of the democratic regime’s essence 
thus begins with an acknowledgement of the problem that this 
regime is meant to solve. 
The human situation creates the problem of interpersonal 
conflicts.  People have values and beliefs, wishes and ways of life 
suited to their tastes; however, the realization of all personal desires 
is impossible because they inherently clash with one another, 
causing interpersonal conflicts.  These interpersonal conflicts 
between individuals challenge democratic regimes to provide 
                                                             
 6 See AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 23–26 (2006) (defining the 
concept of democracy and its essence); see also ASA KASHER, A Jewish and Democratic 
State: A Philosophical Outline, in A MAN’S SPIRIT: FOUR GATES, 12–17 (2000) [Heb]. 
 7 A discussion in depth of the difference between formal and essential 
democracy has no place in the current context, and we will confine ourselves to the 
character of democratic regimes known to us.  All known democratic regimes, 
without exception, depart from the formal characterization and take on essential 
features.  A historical explanation for the character of a given democratic regime 
may be possible in terms of a formal democracy and its appendices, but the product 
of the historical developments, as it appears clearly before us, is a regime of 
essential democracy.  Our approach here characterizes this essence. 
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arrangements that enable individuals to live side by side without 
strife.  The democratic regime deals with this challenge by creating 
fair arrangements that guide citizen behavior when in conflict.  Fair 
arrangements will always preserve human dignity while guiding 
citizens on how to live together despite their fundamental 
differences and conflicts.  Therefore, the preservation of human 
dignity through fair arrangements lies at the core of the essential (as 
opposed to the formalistic) democratic regime.  Fair arrangements 
that preserve human dignity compel society to respect everyone’s 
dignity and refrain from violating it. 
To fathom the essence of democracy, the following two ideas 
must be clearly understood: human dignity8 and fair arrangements 
for its protection.  We use fairness as did John Rawls in his thought 
on justice as fairness; the requirements of fairness can be described 
in terms of the well-known “veil of ignorance,”9 and are considered 
moral requirements because they are justified in terms of demands 
about the protection of human dignity. 
When coming to the conclusion that a democratic regime 
requires preserving human dignity in all circumstances, it will also 
make this demand when seeking to limit basic liberties that are 
mutually conflicting.  A regime that is protective of human dignity 
will also impose limitations on basic liberties when they impede on 
human dignity.  For example, both freedom of movement and 
freedom of property are basic liberties.  Protecting them is part of 
protecting human dignity.  Freedom of movement is limited insofar 
as it violates freedom of property, but democracies will not limit 
freedom of movement on the basis on one’s desire to block 
“undesirables” from the public area that they live since no one has a 
basic freedom to exclude other people from the public realm. 
The current conception of the democratic regime is part of the 
cluster of theories—beginning with Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, 
                                                             
 8 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS CH 2., (1964) (discussing the notion of protecting the person’s human 
dignity or, in its traditional formulation, protecting the dignity of the person created 
in God’s image, which rests on four principles). 
 9 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, A RESTATEMENT 15, 18 (Erin Kelly 
ed., 2001) (defining the original position, where parties are not allowed to know the 
social positions or the particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they 
represent). 
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and up to John Rawls in the 
present10—who have endorsed the social contract approach.11  
Generally, a theory endorsing the social contract approach rests on 
the notion that social arrangements have compelling moral validity 
insofar as they can be justified as plausible results of a potential 
agreement.  In the present context, we focus only on the agreement’s 
contents.12 
We follow Rawls: the theory’s contents are supposed to include 
principles of justice to establish and review the “basic structure” that 
determines, inter alia, the manner the main social institutions ascribe 
                                                             
 10 For a general, up-to-date and comprehensive review, including a broad 
bibliography and further comparison to traditional social contract principles, see 
Fred D’Agostino, Gerald Gaus & John Thrasher, Contemporary Approaches to the 
Social Contract, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (May 30. 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/ 
[https://perma.cc/EF8D-NJAC], (showing that the social contract theories of 
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau rely on the idea of consent). 
 11 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Noel Malcolm ed., Clarendon Press, 2012) 
(1651); JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION (1988); Sharon 
A. Lloyd & Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Apr. 30, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-
moral/#Bib [https://perma.cc/NN8W-R98W]; JOHN LOCKE & PETER LASLETT, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967) (1689); Alex Tuckness, 
Locke’s Political Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 11, 2016), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/ [https://perma.cc/WN9V-
BRM5]; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (G.D.H. Cole trans., 
Prometheus 1988) (1762); DAVID LAY WILLIAMS, ROUSSEAU’S SOCIAL CONTRACT : AN 
INTRODUCTION (2014); Christopher Bertram, Jean Jacques Rousseau, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (May 26, 2017) 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/ [https://perma.cc/957E-YR7B]; 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lara Denis ed., Mary Gregor trans., 
Cambridge U. Press 2017) (1797); Frederick Rauscher, Kant’s Social and Political 
Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Sept. 1, 2016), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/ 
[https://perma.cc/C9HH-VBK4]. 
 12 Authors of philosophical theories endorsing the social contract approach at 
times also endorse an elaborate position on the components of the democratic 
regime.  In the present context, however, we will deal only with the moral principle 
underlying this regime rather than with all its components.  On Rawls’ conception 
of democracy,  see, e.g., Joshua Cohen, For a Democratic Society, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO RAWLS, 86–138 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003); see also Amy Gutmann, 
Rawls on the Relationship between Liberalism and Democracy, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO RAWLS, 168–199 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003), (discussing the 
relationship between Liberalism and Democracy in theory). 
 
 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
428 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 40:2 
basic rights and duties.13  Indeed, the agreement presented in Rawls’ 
theory includes the first principle of justice, formulated as follows: 
“each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme 
of basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for 
others,”14 or in a later formulation: “[e]ach person has the same 
indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, 
which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for 
all.”15 
We believe that a prominent feature of each of these basic 
liberties is that people are meant to enjoy their liberties, as they are, 
without any disruption by authorities, corporations, or by any of its 
citizens or inhabitants.  Our approach is compatible with Rawls’ 
view concerning social contracts and does not derive from Rawls’ 
views on the establishment and enforcement of the agreement.16  His 
positions on these issues do not necessarily derive from his stance 
on the principles of justice and, therefore, we do not deal with them 
in this article.  The first principle of justice does not support an 
understanding of citizens’ basic liberties as limited to the 
relationship between the citizen and government institutions.  
Insofar as a state is supposed to act according to the first principle of 
justice (among all others), it is expected to justify arrangements that 
entail deviations from the general character of the protection of basic 
liberties from all objections.  Arrangements protecting these liberties 
only from objections by government authorities require a 
justification compatible with the first principle of justice.  The 
position formulated in this article is meant to prevent deviations of 
this kind.  Similarly, insofar as the constitution of a state is meant to 
convey the principles at the foundation of its regime, among them 
the first principle of justice, its constitution is meant to establish 
arrangements that do not significantly deviate from the general 
character of the protection of basic liberties from all objections. 
                                                             
 13 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 258 (1996) (discussing why the basic 
structure is taken as the first subject of justice). 
 14 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 53 (1999) (arguing that “these 
principles apply  . . .  to the basic structure of society and govern the assignment of 
rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic 
advantages.”). 
 15 See RAWLS, supra note 9, at 42. 
 16 See generally RAWLS, supra note 14. 
 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/3
2019] Human Rights in the Private Sphere 429 
We are not negating a significant nor real difference between the 
state and each of its citizens; both must respect the human dignity 
of every citizen and both must refrain from any violation of citizens’ 
basic liberties, which is unjustifiable.  Nevertheless, as noted, 
whereas the state has duties touching on the foundation of these 
basic liberties and on the enforcement of the arrangements involving 
them, the individual citizen has no such duty.  Cautiously refraining 
from harming another is considerably different from institutionally 
enforcing this caution.   
We have outlined the general fundamental conception of a 
democratic regime’s essence17 and will now add several conclusions 
about the principle of direct application as well as some further 
clarifications. 
First, let us return to the two examples that opened this article.  
According to the approach presented so far, both of them involve a 
violation of the basic rights of citizens—freedom of expression and 
freedom to demonstrate in one, and the breach of personal emails in 
the other.  However, a similar violation could have been committed 
by a state agency or a local authority, for us, the violation is the same.  
Their grievance should not be altered due to the identification of the 
infringing party. 
According to the conventional approach, an event involving 
police officers disturbing a legal demonstration will be handled in 
the context of public law, based on considerations of infringement 
of basic civil rights.  By contrast, a disturbance to the same legal 
demonstration by citizens who do not hold a government position 
will be handled in a private law context, based on other 
considerations.  According to our approach, even if we maintain the 
distinction between public and private law for general reasons 
unrelated to our concern here, we will still say that considerations 
regarding the infringement of basic civil rights must play a part, 
even when the event is handled in a private law context. 
To simplify, let us consider a specific case of two people holding 
one of the demonstrators to prevent the event—a police officer 
pulling his right arm and a private citizen pulling his left arm.  Both 
are inflicting the same injury on him and, according to our approach, 
it is unjustified to discuss the actions of the private citizen in terms 
different from those used to discuss the officer’s action, insofar as 
                                                             
 17 A discussion in depth of the difference between formal and essential 
democracy has no place in the current context, however this article relates to 
democracies with essential features; see, e.g., BARAK, supra note 6, at 23–26. 
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the actual disturbance of the demonstration is the same.  We could 
discuss other aspects of the police officer’s behavior, such as the 
breach of her duty to protect the demonstrator, incumbent on her by 
virtue of her role but not on the citizen who fulfills no such role.  Our 
concern here is another aspect of the police officer’s behavior—the 
very disturbance of the demonstration. 
Our first systemic claim concerning private law, is that 
considerations touching on the infringement of basic civil rights 
should be allowed to emerge, even though the state and its 
authorities played no part in the infringement under discussion.  
Arguments resting on such considerations may be directed against 
an individual or a corporation and not only against an authority but 
also against the legislature, insofar as it seems to have failed in 
enacting effective sub-constitutional legislation to protect an 
individual from harm by an individual or a corporation.  Such 
arguments may also be directed against the executive branch if it has 
failed to provide suitable protection to the individual against harm 
by an individual or a corporation, according to the relevant 
legislation. 
Another systemic claim that emerges from the approach 
proposed here is one that also lowers the barriers between public 
and private law.  A democratic state is not confined to pointing out 
civil liberties only in the basic realms of life, but can hold civil 
liberties in equal standing to basic rights.  By its very nature, such a 
right enables two justified demands.  First, the right to free 
expression within permitted borders makes room for one citizen’s 
justified demand from another, whoever the other might be, to 
refrain from preventing free expression within permitted borders.  
This demand is justified by the very nature of the democratic regime.  
Second, the right to free expression within permitted borders makes 
room for a justified demand by citizens to protect their possibility of 
implementing this right against anyone seeking to prevent them 
from doing so as they see fit.  This demand is justified so long as it 
is addressed to those whom, according to state arrangements, are 
entrusted with the responsibility and the required authority to 
protect citizens from others seeking to disrupt the implementation 
of their rights.  In a democratic state, entrust state authorities are 
entrusted (such as the police) with this responsibility and the power 
required to exercise it. 
According to the approach proposed, the state is intended to be 
involved in protecting citizens from any infringement of their 
liberties of implementing a basic right in the context of both public 
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and private law.  The state should protect citizens demonstrating 
legally from anyone seeking to prevent them from doing so.  There 
is indeed a difference between situations handled by public law and 
those handled by private law.  In the former, the state is meant to 
refrain from disturbance, from using the power available to it to 
prevent citizens from implementing their basic right; in the latter, 
the state is supposed to intervene to protect citizens from anyone 
seeking to prevent them from realizing such a basic right.  This is a 
significant difference, both conceptually and practically, but does it 
justify the accepted pattern of setting up a barrier separating public 
from private law with regard to the subjugation of private actors to 
constitutional human rights? 
Arrangements protecting citizens are required conceptually, 
rather than on the basis of actual power differences or on other social 
grounds.18  Civil rights in a modern democratic state are no longer a 
defense mechanism for citizens from government authorities but 
have become a necessary component of the regime, without which 
the state may lose its characterization as an essential democracy 
because it no longer meets the ethical requirements of protecting 
human dignity, particularly in situations of conflict. 
Civil rights are usually viewed as moral rights, with a pre-legal 
standing whose special role is to justify the imposition of duties on 
others.19  In a way, constitutional rights translate the moral duty to 
honor basic moral rights into a set of legal rules, relying on an agreed 
recognition of the duty to honor moral norms.20  It merits noting that 
                                                             
 18 See generally JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 1–2 (1990) 
(suggesting that we would have many of the rights provided by our current legal 
system even if that system did not assign them to us); Larry Alexander, Judicial 
Review and Moral Rights, 33 QUEEN’S L. J. 1, 3 (2007) (purporting that while both law 
and morality tell us what we are obligated, permitted, and forbidden to do, “[m]oral 
reasons are the highest authority in deciding what we should do.”). 
 19 See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) (offering a 
“liberal foundation for a political morality.”). 
 20 See generally John Oberdiek, Lost in Moral Space: On the Infringing/Violating 
Distinction and Its Place in the Theory of Rights, 23 L. & PHIL. 325 (2004) (arguing 
against the “moral conception space of rights” and against incorporating the 
“infringing/violating distinction into a theory of rights”); John Oberdiek, Specifying 
Rights Out of Necessity, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (2008) (arguing for a specified, 
rather than general, conception of rights); John Oberdiek, What’s Wrong with 
Infringements (Insofar as Infringements Are Not Wrong): A Reply, 27 L. & PHIL. 293 
(2008) (rebutting the argument that “the category of rights infringement is secure.”). 
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moral norms touching on basic human and civil rights do not 
differentiate between infringements by people, by a corporation, or 
by a government authority due to the classification of these moral 
norms as part of the individual’s duty under the social contract not 
to infringe their fellow-man’s fundamental civil rights.21 
The approach here suggests constitutional expression of this 
basic principle, not only insofar as civil rights are at risk of violation 
by government authorities but also in all other circumstances, when 
the risk is posed by the acts of an individual, a corporation, or an 
entity that is not a government.  Indirect application arrangements 
challenge the implementation of this principle, requiring special 
justification: why should the protection of citizens from 
infringement of their basic rights enjoy constitutional standing when 
they are endangered by government authorities, but sub-
constitutional standing when endangered by citizens, corporations, 
or non-government entities? 
However, we hold that rights are the same rights, the harm is the 
same harm, the protection must be equally effective and cannot be 
private.  We return to these questions below by moving on to a 
broader and more detailed comparison between the direct and 
indirect application models, from several perspectives. 
2.2.  Between the Direct Application Model and the Indirect 
Application Model 
Recent trends show that basic human rights are a factor not only 
to be considered in individuals and government relationships,22 but 
also in relationships between one another.23  In several places in the 
                                                             
 21 Supreme Court of Israel sitting as Court of Appeal: Civil Appeal 294/91, 
Hevra Kadisha [Burial Society] of the Jerusalem Community v. Lionel Aryeh Kastenbaum 
P.D. 46(2) 464  [30/4/1992, Heb.]. 
 22 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW (Daniel Friedman & Daphne Barak-
Erez, eds., 2001) (explaining how human rights originated as rights and freedoms 
vis-á-vis the State and other public authorities). 
 23 See, e.g., Kumm & Ferreres Comella, supra note 4, at 265 (suggesting that 
even though a constitution is addressed to public authorities rather than 
individuals’ private law is not precluded from being subjected to substantive 
constitutional standards in private litigation). 
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world, the accepted view is that human rights law is indirectly 
applied to private law.24  Similarly, according to the direct 
application model, a court must base its decision on constitutional 
rights.  The reason is that the parties have rights and duties toward 
one another and not only toward courts.25 
But in a deep and fundamental sense, as is clarified below, the 
difference between the models is not merely semantics.  In this 
context, it is worth differentiating between the models at two levels: 
one of principles and arguments and another of practical results.  At 
the level of principles, the difference lies in the definition of the 
citizen’s constitutional rights in terms of infringement of a specific 
liberty.  In this instance, the infringing party’s identity is irrelevant.  
At this level, arguments concerning infringements of a liberty will 
be based on the direct application of constitutional rights.  Insofar as 
practical results are concerned, no differences between the models 
will be found in the vast majority of cases. 
Differences between the models are also found at the 
declaratory-educational and implementation levels, particularly in 
the current constitutional situation when courts are less willing to 
grant human rights protection in private law in the absence of 
specific legislation or of a valve concept.  The German legal system, 
for example, imposed a positive duty on the legislature to create 
protections for human rights in private law.26  These moves stress 
the inaccessibility and inevitable difficulty in protecting human 
rights using the indirect application model, whereas the direct 
application model can offer legal systems a more lucid and 
seemingly simpler methodology.  The indirect application model, as 
noted, also splits human rights into two sets within one single legal 
system, and thereby not dealing consistently with the general 
question concerning the dosage of human rights and the balance 
between them when they clash, a topic discussed in the next section. 
Indeed, the Court is in no hurry to adapt the direct application 
model due to the traditional acceptance that the broad use of valve 
                                                             
 24 See infra Chapter I(4). 
 25 See ALEXY, supra note 3, at xl-xli (proposing that the protective duties 
arising from constitutional rights give rise to new private right laws between 
individuals, through the interpretation of private law statutes and the 
development of the common law). 
 26 See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE 
LEGISLATORS: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY 162 (2011) (noting that Germany has 
adopted the technique of issuing orders to the Legislator to impose terms or 
deadlines before which it must take the necessary legislative action). 
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concepts and legal standards such as “good faith” and “public 
policy” provide a wide enough spectrum for the judiciary to protect 
human rights within private law.  However, we think that this 
preference is problematic since the valve concepts lack a priori 
contents of their own.  This in turn evokes the question of whether 
we are actually dealing with a direct application model in disguise.  
Rather, we opine that (1) all elements of society have a direct duty 
to protect human rights of the other instead of a general vague duty 
to protect public policy, (2) human rights hold an honorable role in 
all legal systems, including private law. 
Additionally, the differences between the manner with which 
human rights are treated in public and private law creates a barrier 
to the general protection of human rights in the democratic system.  
Thus, ostensibly creating two separate legal systems and 
disregarding the fundamental guarantee of human rights.  
Moreover, we hold that the source of the implemented rights does 
not influence the extent of their implementation—in other words, 
the direct application model does not grant citizens, per se, 
additional rights, rather it is reliant on the ad hoc balancing of their 
constitutional rights, as enacted by the indirect application model. 
This claim also has declaratory and educational advantages.  
Through a general declaration stating that human rights set in 
constitutions apply in all legal interactions, and through a direct and 
explicit judicial reference to them in every relevant legal interaction 
presented to the courts, the direct application model can help us 
understand the context of human rights, their conceptual role, and 
their place within democratic theory.27 
2.3.  Balancing Human Rights Confliction within the Direct 
Application Model 
The arguments for rejecting the direct application model and 
adopting the indirect application model rely largely on practical 
concerns over excessive violation of individual rights in the direct 
application model.  These arguments, however, mistakenly conflate 
two separate questions—one discussing the mode of applying 
human rights, and the other regarding the balance between 
                                                             
 27 See Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. 
L. REV. 193, 208 (1952) (pointing out that educating toward democracy is one of the 
roles of the judiciary in a democratic society). 
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conflicting human rights.  In our view, the question about the mode 
of applying human rights in private law—both direct and indirect—
does not help answer the second question of the balance between 
conflicting human rights in private law.  Quite the opposite.  As is 
described in the next section, various legal systems already use a 
range of doctrines and techniques to apply human rights in private 
law, subjecting it to human rights standards.28  But these too, by 
themselves, fail to answer questions about the scope of conflicting 
rights and the balance between them.  This issue requires a separate 
analysis that is obviously influenced by the private or public 
standing of the body that violates human rights.29  This standing is 
not derived, strengthened, or weakened due to the use of the direct 
or indirect application model of human rights set in the constitution.  
In the first stage of a court’s analysis, it is determined whether an 
individual has a constitutional right to be protected from the 
government (or from another individual), and in its second stage, 
the scope and contents of the right will be determined.  Ferreres 
Comella and Kumm emphasize that differences between various 
legal systems in the application of human rights in private law 
originate in structural and procedural variations rather than in the 
essential question of balancing conflicting human rights: “There is a 
line to be drawn between the public and the private sphere, but 
doctrines such as indirect effect or state action have little to do with 
guiding substantive choices about where the lines are to be 
drawn.”30 
In the application of the models and any discourse on rights, the 
balancing act is an inevitable and inherent feature.  Ultimately every 
right is relative, whether located in public or private law and the 
balancing act between conflicting human rights is implicit in the 
current use of valve concepts.  We can and should also implement 
valve concepts in the direct application model, relying on the 
proportionality and balance tests set in the constitution and in the 
                                                             
 28 See Kumm & Ferreres Comella, supra note 4. 
 29 Michal Tamir, Human Rights in Private Law: Hybridization of the Balancing 
Tests, in ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 401 (Gideon Sapir, Daphne 
Barak-Erez, & Aharon Barak eds., 2013). 
 30 Kumm & Ferreres Comella, supra note 4, at 284. 
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case law, while taking into account that this balance between 
conflicting human rights is taking place in the private sphere. 
Choosing the direct application model allows us to be concerned 
with the true challenge facing all forms of application—the balance 
and proportionality of conflicting human rights according to the 
interaction at stake.  Ultimately, the issue in a democracy is the 
conflict between two conflicting rights.31  As long as the direct 
application model endorses a proper system of balances, we should 
not fear it might entail harm to individual liberties (beyond the one 
already inflicted by the indirect application model) and to the 
worthy separation between private and public law.  Private law 
presumes that an individual (or a private entity) works for its own 
benefit, whereas in public law it is presumed that the government 
works only for the collective benefit.  The government, as the 
public’s trustee, clearly has no rights of its own, whereas individuals 
do have rights of their own, a difference inevitably leading to 
distinctions in the scope of their duties.  Obviously, the dosage of 
human rights and duties to be weighed in the balance between one 
individual and another, as well as between a corporation and an 
individual, differ from those between the individual and the 
government.  The differences, however, are not a function of the 
sources deriving human rights—especially when private entities 
today, such as Google32 and Apple, are larger and more powerful 
than some countries, while espousing “corporate social 
responsibility”33 as discussed below. 
The scope of the duty to respect human rights—which is not 
derived in binary fashion (either government or private) from the 
identity of the party to the interaction—is also influenced by more 
subtle considerations touching, inter alia, on the relative power of the 
confronting entities, on their exposure to the public realm, and on 
the power of the constitutional right at stake.  Thus, for example, 
even within private law, the duty incumbent on individuals to 
respect human rights is greater for those who enjoy significant 
power and public exposure.  Furthermore, the determination of the 
borders between conflicting human rights follows not only from the 
                                                             
 31 See KASHER, supra note 6, at 16. 
 32 See SHUMEET BALUJA, THE SILICON JUNGLE: A NOVEL OF DECEPTION, POWER 
AND INTERNET INTRIGUE (2015) (discussing Google’s overt economic and political 
power in today’s market). 
 33 See Archie B. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional 
Construct, 38(3) BUS. & SOC’Y 268 (1999) (discussing the evolution of corporate social 
responsibility since the beginning of the 1950s). 
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identity of the infringing party but also from the identity of the party 
whose right has been infringed (such as a government body, a 
powerful socio-economic corporation, a small corporation, or an 
individual).  Be that as it may, the fundamental duty to respect human 
rights in the democratic system is indifferent to these questions.  The 
source of this fundamental right is the constitution and the legal 
system’s basic laws.  The constitution creates the law and given this 
supremacy, the basic rights determined within it should have 
immediate and constant influence on private law, particularly in the 
absence of a sub-constitutional norm that regulates these 
relationships. 
Alternatively, this article’s fundamental approach on the direct 
application of human rights on the public and on the need for a 
constant balance between them draws further support from the 
significant changes in imposing human rights on business 
corporations,34 an issue which we thoroughly discuss in the next 
part, and from the increasing use of contract law for that purpose.  
Contract law, the quintessential realm of private law, serves as a 
dominant framework for implementing human rights in private 
law.35  Human rights are tested through private day-to-day 
interactions no less, and perhaps even more so, than in individual 
encounters with the government.  Direct application of human 
rights in the most banal voluntary interactions seems to reinforce 
their role and the awareness of them in every individual and every 
agency, in all places and at all times. 
Recognizing the power and responsibility of individuals in the 
interpersonal context, then, enhances the protection of basic 
freedoms as well as the role of all components of the legal system—
not only the government—in the structuring of a freedom-fostering 
society.  This approach is not surprising since the contractual 
                                                             
 34 Cf. Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 1, with 
Gavriel Mairone A Grotian Moment: Corporations are Required to Respect Human 
Rights, 54 JUSTICE 27 (Summer 2014) (discussing the tumultuous relationship 
between corporate responsibility and human rights); John Gerard Ruggie, Business 
and Human Rights: The Evolving Incarnational Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 818 (2007) 
(discussing the evolving nature of corporate responsibility regarding human rights 
in the wake of the 2003 UN recommended “Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights.”); Donald Robertson, Business & Human Rights: A New Era of Accountability? 
(Sydney L. Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14/75, 2014) (discussing the 
complexity of corporate liability since the publication of the 2011 UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights). 
 35 See ELI BUKSPAN, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS LAW 60–71 (2007) 
[Heb.] (In Israel this also holds true for torts, labor law, property law, and others). 
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institution, perhaps more than any other legal act, is sensitive to the 
human rights of the other.  The main purpose of a contract is to 
enable people, as social animals, to create relationships, to realize 
themselves, and to voluntarily satisfy most of their needs through 
coordination, cooperation, and mutual concessions.  In this sense, an 
ordinary interpersonal contract may be seen as a microcosm of the 
social contract that explains the existence of the most basic human 
frameworks.  Entrenched in both the private and the social contract 
is insight on the importance of imposing limitation on liberties so as 
to actually enable their existence and expansion. 
Therefore, the implementation of human rights in the most 
common and diverse private interactions, contract and corporate 
law alike, prepares for the direct application of human rights, a 
message that also indicates the general importance of human rights 
as well. 
2.4.  Comparative Law—Close Proximity to the Direct Application 
Model 
With the exponential rise in international discourse on the 
application of human rights in private law, as is described in the next 
section, the variety of contrasting constitutions and legal structures 
evident in different states cannot be ignored.  As we believe that the 
proper and efficient way to decrease human rights violations in the 
private sector is through internal state action in accordance to the 
UN General Principles, this section will be devoted to describing the 
slow, but sure, change toward the direct application model that can 
be seen in legal systems worldwide. 
Indeed, various countries separate human rights from private 
law in the procedural, rhetorical sense.  However, in the essential 
sense, the depth perception and the judicial trend prevailing in most 
legal systems push toward growing recognition of the application of 
human rights in private law. 
Though few constitutions explicitly determine that the direct 
application approach applies, such as South Africa and Greece, most 
countries’ courts generally endorse an interpretive move that blurs 
this certitude.  Other constitutions, such as those of the United States 
and Canada, convey reservations concerning their application in 
private law.  For example, the Canadian Charter determines that 
constitutional rights ostensibly apply only in the relationship 
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between the state and individuals.36  Similarly, almost all sections of 
the U.S. Bill of Rights explicitly address the relationships between 
the state and the citizen.  However, the Thirteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution, in a formulation that departs from the general 
trend, the American legislator determined the implicit direct 
application of a specific constitutional right—freedom from 
slavery—between individuals.37 
Whereas the constitutions of the United States and Germany are 
not unequivocal on the direct application of human rights in private 
law, the formulation in the Greek constitution is clear-cut.  An 
amendment dating back to 2001 inserted into the constitution an 
explicit section that applies constitutional rights in Greek private 
law:38 
The rights of human being as an individual and as a member of 
the society and the principle of the welfare rule of law are 
guaranteed by the State.  All agents of the State shall be obliged to 
ensure the unhindered exercise thereof.  These rights also apply to 
the relations between individuals to which they are appropriate. 
The constitution of South Africa, as said above, also determines 
the direct application of constitutional rights on private law, stating 
“[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person 
if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the 
nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the 
right.”39 
                                                             
 36 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, Art. 31(1) (“This Charter applies(a) to the Parliament and government of 
Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament . . . and (b) to the 
legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the 
authority of the legislature of each province.”). 
 37 See U.S. Const. amend XIII, §2 (stating “Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.”); see also INDIA CONST. art. 15, § 2 (prohibiting discrimination on the 
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.). 
 38 2001 SYNTAGMA [SYN.][CONSTITUTION] 25 (Greece). 
 39 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996 Art. 8.  See also BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] 
[CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 35, para. 1 (Switz.) (adopting the direct 
application model of human rights in private law.  In other countries, such as 
Ireland, Spain, and Brazil, high courts interpreted certain constitutional rights as 
applying to interpersonal relations as well).  Maria Vittoria Onufrio, The 
Constitutionalization of Contract Law in the Irish, the German and the Italian Systems: is 
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Still, this brief review, pointing out differences in the wording of 
the different constitutions, is insufficient in outlining the accepted 
model for the application of human rights to interpersonal 
relationships.  Unfortunately, neither is a review of the comparative 
case law on the accepted approaches of the application of human 
rights in private law.40 
The German constitution, for example, unequivocally 
determines the model of application that applies in German law.  It 
appears that the German constitution views the protection of human 
rights as a general social task that compels not only the authorities, 
as implicit from Section 1(2) and 1(3) of the German constitution 
stating, “(2) The German People therefore acknowledge inviolable 
and inalienable human rights as the basis of every human 
community, of peace, and of justice in the world. (3) The following 
basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary 
as directly applicable law.”41 
However, in Germany, as in other countries, court has found 
ways to apply its determinations to private law as evident in 
German judicial holdings.42  Beginning with the Lüth case, a variety 
of decisions show an indirect application of human rights in private 
law at the formal institutional level.43  This is because only German 
constitutional courts can hear claims that are authorized to 
determine the constitutionality of a law and the way that compels 
                                                             
horizontal indirect effect like direct effect? 4 INDRET (2007), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1371538 
[https://perma.cc/6TSN-JT4N] (discussing the horizontal effect of constitutional 
rights which has been accepted by many European countries); THE ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 184–85 (Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner & 
Cheryl Saunders eds., 2013) (stating that Canada and South Africa especially 
interesting examples regarding the horizontal-effect doctrine and how it has proven 
to be a popular transplant). 
 40 See Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 284 (explaining that an attempt was 
made to explain the difference through institutional and formal arguments). 
 41 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 1, translation at http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/S6AK-GD42]. 
 42 BVerfGE 7/198, Jan. 15, 1958, https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org 
[https://perma.cc/SX93-NEJG]; BVerfGE 39/1, 1975, 
http://www.hrcr.org/safrica/life/39bverfge1.html [https://perma.cc/S2CV-
XFCB]. 
 43 Id. 
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individuals to respect it.44  This means that “mundane” courts lack 
discretion to apply human rights in private law in  cases between 
individuals.  The non-recognition of explicit direct application 
seems to reflect the suspicion that such recognition would enable 
civil courts in Germany to issue rulings on matters bearing on 
individual constitutional rights, which would not be an issue in 
Common Law systems such as the United States and Israel.  Yet, 
given that in a conflict between individuals the German civil court 
is compelled to rule in the spirit of constitutional rights (even though 
they are only determined in the constitutional court), the 
justification for determining how constitutional rights are applied 
obviously relies on procedural rather than essential grounds.  In 
other words, barring any influence on the court’s practical and final 
authority to rule on constitutional rights, which cover all areas of the 
law,45 it is hard to find in Germany a principled-practical difference 
(as opposed to a procedural one) between direct and indirect 
application.46 
Another interesting case to examine the legal system’s vague 
attitude to the application of human rights in private law is the one 
used in Canadian law that formally adopts a model assuming non-
application.  Nevertheless, the case law essentially attests to rulings 
that lessen the dominance of this model in favor of one that 
increasingly strengthens the influence of human rights between 
individuals.47  Resembling the German model, the Canadian model 
endorses the approach that private law and legislation must develop 
in the spirit of the basic rights determined in the constitution and, in 
Canada, in the Charter.48 
                                                             
 44 See Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 275. 
 45 See id. at 244–245. 
 46 See id. at 250–251; Tamir, supra note 29, at 405 (referring to cases where 
courts in Switzerland and Germany applied to themselves the direct application 
model through judicial legislation). 
 47 See RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (Can.) (holding the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to governmental action).  See also 
Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.) (interpreting 
Ontario’s libel laws in connection with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms). 
 48 See Lorraine E. Weinrib & Ernest J. Weinrib, Constitutional Values and Private 
Law in Canada, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW (DANIEL FRIEDMANN & DAPHNE 
BARAK-EREZ EDS., 2001). 
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The U.S. case is even more complex since the U.S. Constitution 
addresses government responsibility.  The central approach in 
American law emphasizes that the judicial system is part of the 
ruling administration to which the Constitution applies and, 
therefore, rights are applied in American law by means of the 
judiciary.  Let us begin by noting that the accepted doctrine for 
applying human rights in private law, in the United States too, is the 
doctrine of state action stating that the demand of a constitutional 
right must be based on a state action, either through the constitution 
or through legislation.49  The doctrine of state action, however, 
which compels the state to protect human rights, applies to judges 
as well in their role as a branch of government.50  Indeed, as is noted 
above, the formulation in the American constitution determines that 
claims of breaching constitutional rights, with very few exceptions, 
can only be addressed to the state.51  By comparison with the 
German legal system, the doctrine of state action seems to separate 
constitutional rights from private law far more clearly than the 
doctrine of indirect application.52  Even with all of this, the American 
system has also found ways to enable the flow of human rights into 
private law.53 
In one such example, the Court in Shelley significantly expanded 
the doctrine of state action in the American legal system.54  In the 
Shelly case, the Court considered a petition by a resident of St. Louis, 
Missouri who sought to prevent an African-American family from 
living in his neighborhood, relying on a contract forbidding the sale 
of the house to “Blacks.”  The Court concluded that even in classic 
conflicts between individuals, every contract holds some sort of 
state involvement, as it determines the relevant legal arrangements 
                                                             
 49 See Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 266. 
 50 See BARAK, supra note 6, at 375. 
 51 The most prominent among them being the Thirteenth Amendment, which 
can be interpreted as applying also to individuals the constitutional right to 
freedom from slavery. 
 52 See e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding racially restrictive 
covenants violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment).  See 
also Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 245. 
 53 See Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 267. 
 54 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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between individuals.55  Furthermore, relying on the idea that courts 
can apply human rights through the judiciary, Shelly determined 
that courts could not uphold actions that breach the right to 
equality—which is protected in the U.S. Constitution.56  This 
expanding interpretation of the Constitution, which covers all legal 
realms, paves the way for applying constitutional rights in 
individual relationships and practically voids the state action 
requirement.  The American court does indeed continue to endorse 
a rhetoric that examines constitutional rights according to the 
doctrine of state action and continues to preserve the official 
division between direct and indirect application.57  This insistence, 
however, including its formal arguments, is not clear, nor does it 
seem to explain precisely why the law strives so hard and so 
creatively to attain essential protection for human rights in private 
law. 
To summarize, the status of human rights in private law 
(manifested in various constitutions) is, in principle, blurred and 
subject to broad interpretation.  Although the various legal systems 
often refrain from defining the model of application as direct, 
human rights seemingly play a clear and explicit role in private law.  
Moreover, even when the direct application approach is explicitly 
mentioned in constitutions, its judicial interpretation remains 
vague.  This can be seen in Greece, where the recognition of the 
direct application constitutional model was a jurisprudence 
innovation for the constitution’s relationship with private law.  In 
light of technological and social developments (including a shift of 
power from the state to private players), this need arose with 
changes in the media and its social influence and the growing need 
to protect individual rights in the civil realm.58  This innovation 
adopted the expression “horizontal balance” between rights or 
“interpersonal influence” between individuals, entailing a violation 
                                                             
 55 See Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 267. 
 56 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV (addressing citizenship and equal protection of 
the laws and was proposed as a response to the American Civil War). 
 57 See Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 268. 
 58 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE SPHERE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra 
note 5, at 159. 
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of a right.59  Nevertheless, even in the Greek legal system, the scope 
of human rights in private law and their application between 
individuals remains undetermined.60  Resembling the Greek 
constitution, the South African constitution also explicitly 
determines the direct application of human rights in private law, 
however, it still needs to be interpreted by judges.61 
In conclusion, the development of the protection of human 
rights in private law worldwide — based on considerations of 
democracy, social justice, and cooperation — illustrates, or at the 
very least predicts, the growing trend toward broader recognition of 
the direct application model.  Unquestionably, common law is ripe 
for recognizing direct mutual relationships with the human rights 
set in the constitution, and the next chapter discusses significant 
international forces that promote this position. 
3.  THE DIRECT APPLICATION MODEL, MODERN CORPORATIONS, AND 
UN LED INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES 
Over the last few decades it has become very common to discuss 
public aspects of corporations, particularly various social 
obligations imposed on corporations.  Due to the enormous financial 
and political power that corporations have gained in the public 
sphere, and their comprehensive impact on the lives of citizens, they 
have been transformed into a legitimate key player in the discourse 
on human rights—even those that are clearly privately originated.62  
                                                             
 59 Id. at 158. 
 60 See Nicos Alivizatos & Pavlos Eleftheriadis, South European Briefing: The 
Greek Constitutional Amendments of 2001, 7(1) SOUTH EUROPEAN SOC’Y AND POL., 63–
71 (2002) (recognizing that, although, the constitution had performed well so far, 
“wide amendment was necessary.”  Unfortunately, the amendment “lost its 
direction . . . .[and] became a vehicle for a vaguely defined modernization.”). 
 61 For further discussion of this topic, see Delisa Futch, Du Plessis v. De Klerk: 
South Africa’s Bill of Rights and the Issue of Horizontal Application 22 N.C.J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 1009, 1011 (1996-1997); see also Khumalo v. Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) 
(S. Afr.). 
 62 See John G. Ruggie & Tamaryn Nelson, Human Rights and the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Normative Innovations and Implementation 
Challenges, 1, 2–6 (Harvard University, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, 
Working Paper No. 66, 2015), 
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In addition, human rights encounters arise frequently and have 
become inherent in day-to-day private interactions with 
corporations (regardless of their size, sector, location, ownership 
and structure) — perhaps, much more than an average individual’s 
encounter with their domestic government.63  Interactions between 
individuals have reached beyond classical human rights violations, 
such as slavery and unlivable work conditions, and focus on new 
aspects, such as privacy, mental and economic well-being, and 
gender. 
In the next few paragraphs, we attempt to describe the current 
state of affairs regarding the balance of power between corporations 
and individuals, namely emphasizing the main changes regarding 
human rights witnessed within modern corporations.  This 
description will substantiate the claim that we are at a crossroads 
heading toward the direct application of constitutional human 
rights in light of the semi-public role of the private corporations in 
the protection of human rights. 
A brief numerical analysis supports this trend: 500 corporations 
control about seventy percent of world trade and each year 
approximately three million new limited liability companies are 
registered.  Likewise, the past decades show an increase in the 
privatization of government functions private corporations have 
increasingly acquired “state-like-impact.”64  Indeed, we are 
witnessing an increasing number of corporations that choose to 
                                                             
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/programs/cri
/files/workingpaper.66.oecd.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX7Q-6S9A] (stating that 
2011 OECD Guidelines dedicated human rights chapter that includes a formulation 
of what it means for businesses to respect human rights and the corporate 
responsibility of respecting human rights); see NADIA BERNAZ, BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY - BRIDGING THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP 3–8 (2017) 
(for more on corporate social responsibility and its influence on different forms of 
capitalism). 
 63 Eric De Brabandere and Maryse Hazelzet, Corporate Responsibility and 
Human Rights—Navigating between International, Domestic and Self-Regulation, 1, 2–6 
(Universiteit Leiden, Research Handbook on Human Rights and International 
Investment Law, 2017), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2913616 
[https://perma.cc/2H62-J4DF] (explaining that there is an undeniable link 
between human rights and non-state actors, which leds to an enhanced need of 
accountability on behalf of the corporations). 
 64 See BALUJA, supra note 32.  See also SARAH ANDERSON & JOHN CAVANAGH, 
FIELD GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005). 
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adopt corporate activities in light of human rights principles, as well 
as instill ideas of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) through 
designated functionaries and publish a “social vision.”65 
3.1.  The Corporation in the Modern Era 
The discourse surrounding questions of the corporations’ role in 
advocating for human rights within democracy relates to an age-old 
question in corporate law: should companies be exclusively 
economic and profit-focused or should they also consider broader 
social causes?66  This question will not be discussed in this article, 
nor is it discussed whether corporations obey court rulings, or 
whether courts and legal actors can or should serve as agents of 
social change.67  Instead, our discussion focuses on those concrete 
characteristics of corporations that illuminate the course of potential 
social change.  The implementation and development of legal 
change as it applies to corporations does not occur randomly.  
Rather, progress in social change naturally proceeds from factors 
related to the corporation’s socio-economic pervasiveness and on 
essential considerations related to their political and financial power 
as social-legal mediators and social innovators, and lack of human 
characteristics that interfere with freedom of contract and personal 
autonomy. 
                                                             
 65 DENISE WALLACE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS: A POLICY-ORIENTED 
PERSPECTIVE 90–119 (2015). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Gad Barzilai, The Ambivalent Language of Lawyers in Israel: Liberal Politics, 
Economic Liberalism, Silence and Dissent, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: 
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 247–279 
(Terry C. Halliday et al. eds., Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publications 2007) 
(arguing that it is “the politics of a ‘legal complex’ of legally trained occupations . . . 
that drives advances or retreats from political liberalism.”). 
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3.1.1.  The Corporation’s Pervasiveness as a Social Component 
Most of society rests on the activities of companies or corporate 
bodies.68  In fact today, some corporations are larger than states—
among the largest 100 organizations in the world, 52 are 
corporations and 48, less than half, are states.69  Since most business 
deals are conducted by corporations, their activity not only 
dominates contractual interactions but also affects other human and 
legal dimensions. 
The business corporation’s routine contractual activities involve 
countless arenas, including capital, labor, property, products, and 
services.  It is fitting that the corporation’s relationship with other 
entities and communities is described as a “nexus of contracts,” a 
particularly apt description regarding mega-corporations’ 
involvement in tangled webs of seemingly endless contracts.70  In 
modern society individual self-realization depends, to a great 
degree, on an individual’s success in negotiating the corporate 
world.  Thus, it is critical that values concerning social change and 
human rights apply to corporations as well as to individuals. 
3.1.2.  The Corporation’s Exposure and Socio-Economic Power 
The significance of corporations as social agents strongly affects 
the change unfolding in modern discourse, primarily since 
corporations are so widespread.  Corporation’s independent legal 
personalities, size, and the separation between ownership and 
management, justify imposing social responsibility and 
constitutional duties on their activities.  For example, a corporation 
(the most common corporate model) has an independent legal 
personality that is separate from that of its investors, who have 
limited responsibility for the company’s actions, omissions, and 
                                                             
 68 See J. E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE 
THEORY OF COMPANY LAW (1993).  See also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). 
 69 ANDERSON & CAVANAGH, supra note 64. 
 70 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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debts.  As such, a corporation holds the incentive and the capability 
to externalize its actions and omissions onto the non-corporate 
world.71  Here, the “principal-agent problem” or “agent’s dilemma,” 
the fundamental problem in company law, comes into play.72 
This concept highlights the separation between ownership and 
control and the ensuing externalization incentives.  The “agent’s 
dilemma” justifies and explains corporate and securities law, while 
imposing on the company’s officers responsibilities toward those 
subject to their decisions.73  The “agent’s dilemma” also intensifies 
the demand to impose social responsibility and human rights on 
business companies and their agents, due to their inherent 
incentives to focus on their own interests at the expense of other 
corporate constituencies, including, inter alia, the capital, 
environmental and human (both labor and customers) realms.74 
The corporation’s public dimension and standing are greater 
than the individual’s; the corporation’s public nature is evidenced 
by its similarities to a state in terms of structure and socio-economic 
power.75  Aharon Barak relied on these grounds in dismissing the 
notion that human rights are “not applicable” to private law: 
Human rights are endangered not only by governments  . . .  human 
rights are greatly endangered by non-governmental bodies.  Indeed, 
some even claim that, in democratic regimes, human rights face 
greater danger from other individuals than from the government.76 
The greater the public exposure and consequences of interaction, 
the greater lies its responsibility   especially due to its wide-scale 
                                                             
 71 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001) 
(arguing that veil piercing cannot be justified and should be abolished because it 
has no social payoff and a regime of direct liability should be put in place.). 
 72 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 70. 
 73 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION & PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991) (analyzing the separation of ownership 
and control within a corporation and the consequences of that dynamic). 
 74 See Further Hearing 7/81 Penider, Investment Co. v. Castro 37(4) PD 673, 694 
(1983) (Isr.); CrimA 4148/03 Cohen v. State of Israel 58(2) PD 629, 632 (2004) (Isr.). 
 75 The regime of a business company is very similar to that of a democratic 
state.  Thus, for instance, the structure of rights and voting in a business company, 
from which “control” also derives, is usually set up democratically, i.e., one vote 
per share.  The institutional structure and the typical corporate government of the 
business company also resemble a state.  Similar to government, a business 
company also has a small and elected implementing body (the board and the 
executive) that holds control through the delegation of authority.  The social 
attitude toward the business company is also illustrated in the vigorous discussion 
of its social purposes, far exceeding the maximization of the shareholders’ wealth. 
 76 Aharon Barak, Protected Human Rights and Private Law, in KLINGHOFER BOOK 
ON PUBLIC LAW 163, 208 (Y. Zamir. Ed.) (Heb.) (emphasis added). 
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influence and ability to “endanger” its many constituencies.  Thus, 
public companies with marketable investments and publicly traded 
shares have increased social responsibility more than that of small 
family firms with limited social exposure and few investors.  
Similarly, large, multinational conglomerates have greater social 
responsibility (mainly toward consumers) than small businesses.  
The graded imposition of social responsibility according to a 
corporation’s potential level of exposure rests on both utilitarian and 
functional grounds.  Acknowledging the social responsibility of the 
corporation “simultaneously” acknowledges its effects on a 
relatively large number of “beneficiaries.” 
3.1.3.  The Use of the Corporation as a Legal-Social Mediator 
The prevalent social exposure of corporations as opposed to that 
of individuals suggests another possible explanation for the 
development of social and constitutional change as it applies to 
them.  As we note, society is significantly affected by the existence, 
actions, and views of large companies.77  A corporation, whether 
small or large, is a community composed of a nexus of contracts.  
The nature of corporations, specifically that they are comprised of 
many participants, enables them to act as “mediators” in the 
adoption of social norms.78 
The influence of the corporation, then, is not only “local”—
affecting only the human elements close to it, such as its officials and 
                                                             
 77 See PARKINSON, supra note 68, at ch. 1.  See also CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 21ST CENTURY (Ramon Mullerat 
ed., 2005) (compiling insights on the function of corporate social responsibility and 
how it works worldwide). 
 78 Robert D. Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency 
in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717 (2001) (demonstrating how a company can 
encourage trust and good character among its agents in ways that overcome the 
agency problem and encourage others to cooperate).  See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (2018) (examining the 
relationship between social norms and certain areas of corporate law like fiduciary 
duties, corporate governance, and takeovers); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS 
FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 297 (2005) (“[Global 
corporations] are going to command more power, not only to create value but also 
to transmit values, than any transnational institutions on the planet.”). 
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employees—but extends also to a broader public that includes the 
corporation’s clients, suppliers, and shareholders (however small 
and scattered).  Indeed, it is common, particularly when 
environmental liability is at stake, for the corporation’s actions to 
influence the general public.  The goal is to create mechanisms that 
account for social considerations arising from the company’s actions 
and the company’s relationships with associated communities. 
A good example of this type of mechanism is adoption of ethics 
programs.79  Ethics programs and codes usually include systematic 
visions of constitutive legal, social, and business validity, which 
represent and explain compulsory ethical rules, inter alia on the basis 
of the organization’s constitutive features and of democratic values.  
The codes relate to such topics as responsibility, trust, credibility, 
honesty, professionalism, and sensitivity to the organization’s 
negative image.  They are also concerned with the organization’s 
commitment to the protection of human dignity, especially to life 
and health, to its clients (creditors, suppliers, employees, and the 
public), and to environmental issues.  In this manner, the ethics code 
is a link that serves to mediate between the economic goals of the 
corporation and its social ones and serves as an identity card that is 
unique to the company and can reflect the company’s context and 
its responsibility toward society. 
3.1.4.  The Autonomy of Personal Will in a Corporate Context 
Due to corporate characteristics, the typical corporation can 
further the development of social and constitutional changes more 
                                                             
 79 See Eli Bukspan & Asa Kasher, Ethic in Business Corporations: Legal and Moral 
Considerations, 2 L. & BUS. 159 (2005) (Heb.).  See also Growing the Carrot: Encouraging 
Effective Corporate Compliance, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1783 (1996) (assessing the 
difficulties that corporations face in deciphering and complying with the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, and suggesting additional and 
potentially more effective measures for ensuring appropriate corporate conduct); 
The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the 
Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2122–41 (2003) (arguing 
that the good intentions of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation will do little to improve 
corporate behavior due to complications surrounding the drafting of corporate 
codes and the way the statute incentivizes rewriting the corporate codes of well-
behaved companies in order to avoid litigation). 
 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/3
2019] Human Rights in the Private Sphere 451 
effectively than individuals can.  Besides their greater social 
exposure and power, the corporations’ lack of a natural (as opposed 
to a legal) personality eases their categorization as significant social 
actors and explains their relative dominance in the process of social 
change affecting the international discourse.  The corporations’ legal 
personality may explain the reason why the court has shown higher 
readiness to interfere with their freedom of contract (through the 
principles of good faith and public order) than with that of 
individuals.  In other words, although corporations enjoy 
constitutional protection and are acknowledged as legal 
personalities and individual liberties do not fully apply to them.80 
A corporation is an artificial creation and interference in its 
affairs touches on financial issues rather than on personal rights.  
Given the autonomy of private will, the usual reluctance to apply 
basic principles of public law to private law is milder.81  Intuitive 
and legal sensitivity to the constitutional right (the autonomy of 
personal will) is thus lower when the subject is a corporation.  This 
fact can also explain the jurisprudential inclination, even if 
unconscious, to encourage adoption of social responsibility as it 
applies to corporations through the erosion of the traditional laws of 
autonomy—contract law. 
A more qualified protection of corporate freedom of contract 
relies on an approach suggested in literature and in judicial opinions 
                                                             
 80 See generally Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of 
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985) (suggesting that the Santa Clara case 
has not been fully understood and that the brief opinion does not express a pro-big-
business theory of the corporation); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the 
Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987) (discussing the 
historical reasons for why corporations are referred to as legal persons rhetorically, 
and noting that the original theoretical reasoning for the rhetorical convention no 
longer applies to modern corporate law); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: 
Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 577 (1990) (assessing why the 
Supreme Court provided Bill of Rights guarantees to corporations and evaluating 
which theory of corporations would allow for such protections). 
 81 Perceiving the corporation as real is actually compatible with imposing 
responsibility on it.  See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the 
Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 767 (2005) (tracing the changes to corporate form throughout history and 
the accompanying theories of the corporation, and positing that the dominant real 
entity theory of the corporation is compatible with corporate social responsibility 
measures). 
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whereby not all rights held by people are also held by corporations.82  
Thus, an existence of a physical entity does not necessarily lead to the 
protection of autonomy of personal will.  The liberty at stake first and 
foremost protects the “human” in people and as such, its application 
to a corporation is not without question. 
In conclusion, there is no doubt that corporations play a 
significant role in democracies today and are natural trustees for 
reinforcing human rights.  However, both the state domain and the 
global domain attempt to prevent corporations from violating 
human rights.  These challenges mainly arise from the principles of 
international human rights law, which is nearly always state-based 
and applicable to corporations or the private sphere through specific 
legislation: first, the state has sovereignty to determine the extent of 
human rights law to be applied in its territory; second, even though 
the past few decades have shown incredible progress in 
standardizing human rights law within international law, 
corporations are generally not recognized as entities bound by 
international law.83 
Accordingly, the direct application model presented in this 
article justifies and establishes suitable and practical 
intergovernmental solutions to applying human rights to 
corporations and contend with the trends described.  This approach 
coincides with the winds of change that have defined recent 
international discourse on human rights and corporations; 
advocating that states, rather than international law and multilateral 
initiatives, must prevent violations of human rights by 
corporations.84 
                                                             
 82 See CA 105/92 Re’em Engineers & Constructors Ltd. v. Nazareth Ilit 
Municipality 47(5) PD 189, 212–214 (1993) (Isr.) (“A corporation enjoys liberties 
enabled by its character as a corporation.  Freedom of occupation, property rights, 
defendant’s rights, and other rights for which the existence of a physical (‘flesh and 
blood’) entity is not vital (such as the right to a family) are the lot of every legal 
personality.  Hence, a corporation enjoys freedom of expression, as does any flesh 
and blood creature.”). 
 83 Dana Weiss, Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights, in MARKET, LAW AND 
POLITICS: ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 65, 67 (Resling ed., 2012) (Heb.). 
 84 See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 YALE L. J. 443 (2001) (providing justifications for the advantages 
of using international law and multilateral initiatives to increasingly enforce human 
rights on corporations). 
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3.2.  New International Discourse and Institutional Conceptual 
Change 
Two main aspects lead to the conclusion that the direct 
application model in corporate context provides an efficient 
alternative to safeguarding and protecting human rights today.  The 
first aspect, discussed above, shows the significance of corporations 
in modern democracies.  The second aspect deals with increasing 
international discourse on human rights and corporations—led by 
the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework that can be found in 
the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business Human Rights 
  which is applicable to “all States and to all business enterprises, 
both transnational and others, regardless of their size, sector, 
location, ownership and structure.”85  Despite the fact that this 
discourse takes place internationally, its implementation focuses on 
individual state action.  The international discourse on corporation’s 
human rights responsibilities—in addition to the legal blurring of 
the once clear line between the private and public spheres that is 
mentioned above—strengthens the claim that the purpose of the 
corporation no longer solely focuses on sustaining profits, rather it 
plays an important societal role in protecting human rights. 
Escalating reports of human rights violations by corporations 
triggered the establishment of the 1998 United Nations (UN) Sub-
Commision on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
working group on business and human rights.86  The group’s task 
was to recommend and propose methods to promote economic, 
social, and political rights87—producing a twenty-three article 
                                                             
 85 Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, at 6 (Mar. 21, 2011) (annexing the Guiding Principles to 
a report made to the Human Rights Council).  See also WALLACE, supra note 65, at 
233–251 (showing attempts of the United Nations to regulate transnational 
corporations); César Rodríguez-Garavito, Business and Human Rights: Beyond the End 
of the Beginning in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BEYOND THE END OF THE BEGINNING 
11 (César Rodríguez-Garavito ed., 2017). 
 86 John G. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International 
Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 820 (2007). 
 87 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of 
Minorities Res. 1988/8,, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/1998/8 (Aug. 20, 1998). 
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document in 2003.  However, their recommendations were not 
approved by the Commission on Human Rights (since replaced by 
the Human Rights Council).88 
Although the document was not approved—nor was it binding 
—89 the impact of the document resonated throughout several 
leading countries beliving that the issue of business and human 
rights did require serious attention.90  In 2005, the UN Secretary 
General, Kofi Annan, appointed a Special Representative—
Professor John Gerard Ruggie—with a wide-ranging mandate to 
“identify and clarify” international standards and policies in 
relation to business and human rights, elaborate on key concepts 
including “corporate complicity” and “spheres of influence,” and 
submit “views and recommendations” for consideration by the 
commission.91 
During the first two years of his mandate, Ruggie empirically 
mapped current international standards and practices regarding 
business and human rights, ranging from the most deeply rooted 
international legal obligations to voluntary initiatives.92  After three 
years, Ruggie made only one recommendation: the most effective 
way to conceptualize the way forward was through the “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework,93 which he elaborated in his final 
report.94  The Framework rests on three pillars: 
                                                             
 88 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Draft Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprise with regard 
to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/1998/8 (Aug. 20, 1198). 
 89 UN Human Rights Commission Res. 2004/11, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.2/2014/L.73/Rev.1 (Apr. 20, 2004) 
 90 Ruggie, supra note 86, at 821. 
 91 UN Human Rights Commission Res. 2005/69, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/L.87 at 2 (Apr. 15, 2005). 
 92 Ruggie, supra note 86, at 819. 
 93 John G. Ruggie & Tamaryn Nelson, Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises: Nomative Innovation and Implementation Challenges 3 
(Harv. Kennedy Sch. Corp. Soc. Resp. Initiative Working Paper No. 66, 2015). 
 94 John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue 
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises), 
Protect, Respect, and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. doc. 
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
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1. It is the state’s duty to protect against human rights abuses by 
third parties, including business, through appropriate policy-
making, regulation, and adjudication; 
2. Corporations have an independent responsibility to respect 
human rights: business enterprises should act with due diligence to 
avoid infringing upon the rights of others and to address adverse 
situations with which they are involved; 
3. Victims of human rights abuses need greater access to 
effective remedies, be them judicial or non-judicial. 
After six years of extensive research, in 2011, the UN Human 
Rights Council unanimously “endorsed” the Framework and its 
thirty-one Guiding Principles, marking the first time a UN body had 
ever endorsed a normative text that governments did not negotiate 
themselves.95 
Although the Framework and Guiding Principles are not legally 
binding, they provided an unprecedented international standard for 
states and corporations to take an active role in protecting human 
rights.  Their resonance and impact worldwide is indisputable, with 
numerous international bodies and states adopting and 
implementing the Guiding Principles on large corporations.  In light 
of this, a 2017 UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights 
provided guidelines to assist small and medium sized enterprises 
(SME’s), defined commonly as companies with under 250 
employees, to implement the Guiding Principles.96  These new 
guidelines highlight and emphasize that although the SME’s may 
have less capacity and more informal processes, their impact upon 
human rights can be just as significant as on transnational 
corporations.97 
Numerous important resolutions have been adopted within the 
three major UN organs dealing with human rights − the Third 
Committee of the General Assembly,98 the United Nations High 
                                                             
 95 Ruggie & Nelson, supra note 93, at 5. 
 96 Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/35/32 (2017). 
 97 See RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO, supra note 85, at 19–22. 
 98 See generally Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Issues (Third Committee), 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
https://www.un.org/en/ga/third/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/XX57-4S7R]. 
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Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)99 and the United Nation 
Human Rights Council,100 in light of the Guiding Principles.  First, 
Resolution 26/22, proposed by Norway, focused on the “Access to 
Remedy” Pillar of the Guiding Principles.101  In this resolution, in 
order to redress the imbalance of remedies for victims of human 
rights violations, the Human Rights Council requested to “continue 
work to facilitate the sharing and exploration of the full range of 
legal options and practical measures to improve access to remedy 
for victims of business-related human rights abuses.”102  Second, In 
November 2014,103 OHCHR launched the “Accountability and 
Remedy Project” in order to contribute to more effective 
implementation of the Guiding Principles.  The project focused on 
substantive legal and practical issues that have an impact upon the 
effectiveness of judicial mechanisms in achieving corporate 
accountability and access to remedy in cases of business-related 
human rights abuses.  Third, the 2030 Agenda for sustainable 
                                                             
 99 See generally UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org [https://perma.cc/2Q3U-49K2]. 
 100 The Human Rights Council replaced the former 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CHR/Pages/ 
CommissionOnHumanRights.aspx [https://perma.cc/FAF2-MWPF]; See UNITED 
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/C522-5DUY] (detailing the history of the Human Rights 
Council and how it replaced the former United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights). 
 101 Note Resolution 26/9, proposed by Ecuador, to establish an open-ended 
intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights to elaborate an international 
legally binding instrument to regulate activities of transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises.  This Resolution has not received much support, as the 
creators of the General Principles envisioned their application on an individual 
state level, and an international binding treaty would decrease their chance of 
implementation throughout the world.  Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (Jul 14, 2014). 
 102 Human Rights Council Res. 26/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/22 at 3 
(Jul. 15, 2014). 
 103 See OHCHR Accountability and Remedy Project: Improving accountability and 
access to remedy in cases of business involvement in human rights abuses, UN OFFICE OF 
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/OHCHRaccountabilityand
remedyproject.aspx [https://perma.cc/FG4X-3LQW] (explaining the purposes 
and phases of the Accountability and Remedy Project). 
 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/3
2019] Human Rights in the Private Sphere 457 
development adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 
2015,104 expresses another perspective of the important role of the 
Guiding Principles in the private sector.  This agenda includes a plan 
of action with 17 goals to be in initiated over the next 15 years and 
specifically acknowledges the desire to diversify the private sector, 
from micro-enterprises to cooperatives to multinational 
corporations, calling “upon all businesses to apply their creativity 
and innovation to solving sustainable development challenges.”105  
In June 2017, the Human Rights Council asked that a working group 
on the issue of human rights, transnational corporations, and other 
business enterprises give due consideration to the implementation 
of the Guiding Principles in the context of the 2030 Agenda.106 
In addition, the Guiding Principles have been effective outside 
the United Nations as well.107  A leading example can be seen in the 
2011 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)108 Guidelines Revision,109  which included also an added 
human rights chapter indicating the importance of businesses to 
respect human rights and determine the systems that companies 
instill to meet their responsibility to respect human rights, centered 
on human rights due-diligence processes.  In addition, the “General 
Policies” chapter of the OECD Guidelines repeats the General 
Principles framework to respect human rights, while establishing a 
new due-diligence requirement for all subjects covered by the 
Guidelines.110  Additional examples can be seen in the International 
                                                             
 104 G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
(Oct. 21, 2015). 
 105 Id. at 29. 
 106 Human Rights Council Res. 35, U.N Doc. A/HRC/35/L.11, at 3 (June 19, 
2017). 
 107 WALLACE, supra note 65, at 119–132. 
 108 The OECD  is an intergovernmental economic organization with 35 
member countries, which focuses on promoting policies that will improve 
economic and social well-being.  See generally ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org [https://perma.cc/28JX-6Q3F]. 
 109 Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises 2011 edition (2011) (providing advice to multinational 
businesses on how to conduct business responsibly). 
 110 Ruggie & Nelson, supra note 94, at 5–6. 
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Finance Corporation (IFC)111—the largest global institution focusing 
exclusively on encouraging the private sector development in 
developing countries; the adoption of the ISO 2600’s Social 
Responsibility Standard of the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO),112 providing guidance rather than rules for its 
members on social responsibility −translating the Guiding 
Principles into effective action. 
Moreover, the Guiding Principles have found their way into the 
European Union, seen by the European Commission initiative to 
produce produced guidelines for small and medium-sized 
enterprises in accordance with the Guiding Principles.  Over the past 
few years, there have been significant steps paving the way for 
regulation that will be uniformly binding for all EU member states.  
In December 2014, the European Commission published the directive 
on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information, which 
determines that all large public-interest entities (listed companies, 
banks, insurance undertakings and other companies that are so 
designated by Member States) with more than 500 employees 
should disclose in their management report relevant and useful 
information on their policies, main risks, and outcomes relating to 
human rights.  The Directive required the Commission to prepare 
non-binding guidelines on reporting non-financial information, 
which should be first reported in early 2018.113  An additional area 
showing the EU’s intent to promote binding regulation is the EU 
institution’s political agreement to control trade in “conflict 
minerals” (tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold) from conflict-affected 
and high-risk areas.114 
                                                             
 111 See generally INT’L FIN. CORP., http://www.ifc.org 
[https://perma.cc/R4KY-3QXF]. 
 112 See generally ISO 26000 - Social Responsibility, INT’L ORG. FOR 
STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/iso-26000-social-responsibility.html 
[https://perma.cc/6G76-TY6A] (collecting information concerning ISO 26000 
including supporting organizations and relevant publications). 
 113 See generally Company Reporting, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/company-reporting/non-
financial_reporting/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/FED2-ZFFU] (providing 
resources on financial and non-financial reporting requirements for the EU). 
 114 See 2017 O.J. 60 (May 19, 2017) available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2017:130:TOC.  In May 2017 the European Parliament 
approved a draft of the regulation.  The “conflict minerals” law will oblige all but 
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Most importantly, the Guiding Principles have reached 
individual states, which have slowly begun to implement various 
corporate regulations on human rights.  Many countries choose to 
create a National Action Plan (NAP)—a state policy outlining the 
strategic orientation and concrete activities to address a specific 
policy issue, advocated by the UN Working Group on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and business 
enterprises.115  The NAP outline provides states recommendations 
on implementing the General Principles on procedural and content 
aspects to be considered in the light of the national context.116 
France is one of the leading countries to implement the Guiding 
Principles.117  In February 2017, the French National Assembly 
passed a legislation requiring French-based companies, which 
directly or indirectly employ at least 5,000 workers in France or 
10,000 workers worldwide, to establish a “plan de vigilance” (due 
diligence document),118  addressing all possible risks within the 
corporation’s daily work in the areas of human rights (the legislation 
was later declared constitutional by the French Constitutional 
Court).119  Any company breaching this law faces civil liability and 
                                                             
the smallest EU importers of tin, tungsten, tantalum, gold to do “due diligence” 
checks, in accordance with OECD guidelines, on their suppliers.  Moreover, big 
manufacturers will also have to disclose how they plan to monitor their sources to 
comply with the rules.  Due diligence obligations will apply from January 1, 2021 
to allow member states time to appoint competent authorities and importers to 
become familiar with their obligations.  Although this regulation is very specific, it 
indicates a step towards direct application of human right in the private sphere. 
 115 See RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO, supra note 86, 26–32. 
 116 Many states have already produced a NAP, such as UK, USA, Italy, 
Germany and France, with a full list available at OHCHR, State national action 
plans on Business and Human Rights 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx. 
[https://perma.cc/3FJZ-LNZA] (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). 
 117 Important: The French Government Published Its National Action Plan for the 
Implemenation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, VIGEO EIRIS 
(Feb. 5, 2017). 
 118 Edwin Lopez and Jennifer McKevitt, France Passes Law Requiring Supply 
Chain Due Diligence, SUPPLY CHAIN DIVE (Mar. 2, 2017), 
http://www.supplychaindive.com/news/France-supply-chain-human-rights-
reporting-audits/437191/ [https://perma.cc/Y8AN-QQV2]. 
 119 Sandra Cossart, Jérôme Chaplier, and Tiphaine Beau De Lomenie, The 
French Law on Duty of Care: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All, 
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potential fines of up to ten million euros.  Other examples include: 
Switzerland’s obligations to Swiss corporations and their 
subsidiaries, including imposing a due diligence obligation;120 
British companies’ requirement to submit anti-slavery and human 
trafficking statements;121 and the unique cooperation in the 
Netherlands between the government, local corporations, NGOs, 
and employee organizations to create a plan embracing the Guiding 
Principles.122 
The United States does not have any federal legislation imposing 
direct binding duties on human rights issues on corporations and 
has mostly relied on the indirect application model of human rights.  
However, there are a few proposals and cases that could indicate a 
change.  First, the June 2000 Corporate Code of Conduct required 
any U.S. corporation employing over twenty persons in a foreign 
country, either directly or indirectly to ensure the protection of 
human rights.123  Second, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
and Consumer Protection Act requires companies listed on the 
American stock exchange (including foreign companies and 
subsidiaries) to report any payment made to a foreign government 
or to the U.S. government for the purchase of oil, natural gas, or 
mineral resources, mainly concerned with associated human rights 
violations to these fields.124  Third, the recently revived use of the 
                                                             
Bus. & Hum. Rts. J., 2(2), 317–323 (2017); Bettina Grabmayr, Duty of Care Law: French 
Constitutional Council Gives the Green Light, ECOVADIS (Apr. 20, 2017). 
 120 Elizabeth Umlas, Human Rights Due Diligence: Swiss Civil Society Pushes the 
Envelope, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://business-humanrights.org/en/human-rights-due-diligence-swiss-civil-
society-pushes-the-envelope [https://perma.cc/BJ5B-NPB4]. 
 121 Eric De Brabandere and Maryse Hazelzet, supra note 63, at 1, 2–6, 17. 
 122 Id., at 18. 
 123 Corporate Code of Conduct Act of 2000, H.R. 4596, 106th Cong. (2000).  The 
Act was eventually rejected by the American Congress but shows discusses the 
importance of a implement a safe and healthy workplace, ensure fair employment, 
including prohibition of the use of child and forced labor, prohibition of 
discrimination based upon race, gender, national origin, or religious affiliation, 
respect for freedom of association, and the payment of a living wage to all workers 
and additional duties related to human rights. 
https://www.congress.gov/106/bills/hr4596/BILLS-106hr4596ih.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2C55-39R8]. 
 124 De Brabandere and Maryse, supra note 63, at 16; Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009–2010). 
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Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been used by U.S. courts to implement 
human rights obligations on corporations indirectly, by granting 
remedies to foreign citizens for human rights violations committed 
outside of the United States.125  U.S. Federal Appellate Courts 
remain divided over whether corporations can be sued on the basis 
of ATS or whether they are excluded outside the scope of the law.126 
3.3.  The Way Forward:  The Corporation as the Spearhead of the Direct 
Application Model 
The role of the corporation in modern international society, 
specifically the State’s duty to protect its citizens from human rights 
violations by the private sector, by taking appropriate steps to 
ensure effective remedies upon abuse, and the independent corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, illustrate the justifications and 
benefits of the direct application model of human rights in the 
private sphere.  The basis of the UN Guiding Principles, as 
established by John Ruggie and later ratified by numerous 
international bodies, provided States with the necessary tools to first 
address human rights violations by corporations.  Ruggie’s motive 
was not to create a binding multilateral treaty, but rather to create a 
non-binding international standard that can be modified within 
each state as it deemed fit.  An example can be seen in the 
recommendations for States to adopt a National Action Plan to 
address specific human rights issues, as done by numerous states 
worldwide.  Still, the State’s mission to “protect” its citizens from 
human rights violations, accompanied by the State’s obligation to 
supply appropriate and effective “remedies” for human rights 
breaches, challenge the State to a new legal and constitutional 
mindset. 
The direct application model focuses on the nature of the 
democratic regime, and the duties of the State itself, under the social 
                                                             
 125 Alien Tort Statute 28 U.S. Code § 1350; De Brabandere and Maryse, supra 
note 63, at 9–12; BERNAZ, supra note 62, 260–284. 
 126 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  See also Jesner v. Arab Bank 137 
S. Ct. 1432 (2017) (currently pending in the United States Supreme Court); Adam 
Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh if Firms Can Be Sued in Human Rights Cases Image, 
N.Y. Times (Apr. 3, 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/us/politics/supreme-court-human-
rights-arab-bank-terrorism.html?mcubz=0&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/B3CU-
UKWN]. 
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contract, to protect its citizens or their basic liberties from others and 
to take appropriate steps, i.e., remedies, to punish and redress 
business-related human rights abuses when they occur.  The 
democratic regime with the State is the only player that can 
effectively solve conflicts between individuals and guide them to 
uphold two major concepts essential to democracy—protecting 
human dignity and providing fair arrangements for its protection.  
Using the constitution, the direct application model provides an 
effective arrangement that allows the legal system and individuals 
to safeguard human dignity.  As opposed to the indirect application 
model, albeit which is more commonly used but through a series of 
sophisticated “legal acrobatics,” preventing the justice system to 
easily protect its citizens from human rights violations by the private 
sector, the direct model provides incentive for corporations to respect 
human rights as a whole and provide a direct system of remedies that 
simplifies the process for individuals to create human rights claims 
directly against corporations as opposed to the indirect application 
model.127 
Each State implements the direct application model differently.  
Some States, such as South Africa, have already applied the direct 
application of human rights to the private sector using the state 
constitution.  Others have revived indirect legal techniques and old 
legislation to find procedural and fundamental loopholes that allow 
states to apply human rights to the private sector, as was recently 
done with the Alien Tort Statute.128  Regardless, it seems that the 
acceptable law, and even the appropriate law, shows trends toward 
subjugating corporations to the constitutional human rights 
obligations.  Moreover, the direct application model provides this 
trend with the necessary expressive recognition in today’s corporate 
and democratic reality. 
                                                             
 127 Cf.  Protect to Principles 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the UN Guiding Principles, respect 
to Principles 11-15 and remedies to Principles 25 and 26.  For a possible tool, 
representing the indirect method of applying human rights on the corporate 
directors and officers, see Cynthia A. Williams and John M. Conley, Is There an 
Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights? 74 UNIV. OF CINCINNATI L. REV. 
75 (2005). 
 128 See Weiss, supra note 83 at 67 (discussing Israel); Ratner, supra note 84 at p. 
498. 
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4.  CONCLUSION 
This article discusses the direct application of human rights in 
the realm of private law.  In many legal systems constitutional 
human rights are part of public law and their application to private 
law through an indirect application model is limited, implicit, and 
unsystematic. 
This article holds that this mechanism challenges the 
implementation of a democratic worldview, which recognizes not 
only a basic individual right to realize human liberties, but also, the 
need to protect the possibility of realizing these rights.  Accordingly, 
the article holds that the state must be involved in protecting citizens 
from any violation of their rights, both in public and private spheres, 
especially in context of the modern corporation. 
However, the prevalent distinction concerning the identity of 
the breaching entity creates two ostensibly separate constitutional 
systems, all within one single regime drawing its power from 
systematic and coherent basic principles.  Furthermore, this 
distinction engages in legal “acrobatics” through its use of creative 
legal techniques, such as the “State Action” doctrine, or blurred 
valve concepts such as the “good faith” and “public policy” 
principles.  We contend that democratic regimes need not 
“camouflage” their actions, rather openly rely on a direct 
application model. 
Moreover, the direct application of human rights in private law 
actually realizes the constitution’s goals as required by a democratic 
legal system, without any dependence on the identity of the 
infringing entity, whether it is public or private. 
Some hold that adopting the direct application model in private 
law may lead to the violation of human rights, given that private law 
lacks the necessary tools to balance rights.  As we argue and show 
at length, this fear is unrealistic.  The discussion on individual rights, 
including in public law, unfolds within the context of balancing 
rights, which is struck regardless of whether human rights are 
applied directly or indirectly. 
Recent trends show that corporations hold increasing social 
responsibility, due to their incredible financial and political power 
in key areas that were once dominated by public entities.  As the 
social responsibility of the private sector grows, so too does its 
responsibility.  It is not surprising that international discourse and 
state action following the 2011 UN Guiding Principles advocates 
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that states enforce the newly acquired responsibility, and the direct 
application model is closely connected to this mission as well as its 
mission to enable more efficient and accessible remedies for 
corporate human rights breaches. 
Moreover, the comparative review of the status of human rights 
in private law indicates that even though most legal systems refrain 
from formally defining the application model as direct, human 
rights have become increasingly significant in the context of private 
law as if the direct application model is almost here.  The suggested 
approach is not meant to blur the current trends and distinctions 
between public and private law but to add additional justifications 
to applying human rights in private law. 
To conclude, this article holds that the direct application model 
is not only justified by deep democratic ideals and the current 
international discourse, but can also serve as the most expressive, 
effective, and pertinent manner to ensure the implementation of 
basic rights; it is essential to democracies and their legal systems to 
challenge their current “constitutional mindset.”  A modern 
corporations’ legal obligation to respect human rights embodied in 
the liberal constitutions is a crucial component for a democratic and 
humane society, and the direct application model—with its 
expressive and legal significance—is a natural step in the right 
direction. 
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